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Abstract
In the face of demand uncertainty, a monopolist can ob-
serve sales as a controlled reaction to its price and ad-
vertising so as to improve the choice of this marketing
mix in the future. Furthermore, to upgrade its knowl-
edge about demand the firm has the option to invest in
external market intelligence and thus to directly acquire
relevant information. Using a two-period model we de-
termine the firm’s profit-maximizing learning strategy
using all three of these levers: price, advertising, and in-
formation acquisition. This illustrates the firm’s tradeoff
of actively managing its consumer base through costly
marketing, exploiting expected demand through pricing,
and increasing the efficiency of its actions by means of
costly outside information. An extension of the model
to the case with internal budget constraints on informa-
tion acquisition is provided, and a numerical example is
discussed.
1 Introduction
In a dynamic market fraught with uncertainty a firm
can acquire information to improve its operational deci-
sions. It can also spend money on advertising, increas-
ing the demand for its products. Here we examine the
joint problem of advertising, pricing, and information
acquisition. This extends the consideration set of the
pricing and advertising decisions in the seminal contri-
bution by Dorfman and Steiner [9] to include informa-
tion acquisition in a simple and analytically tractable
setting. The problem is solved using dynamic pro-
gramming; informational and operational actions persis-
tently interact, and information can come from an out-
side source (such as a market-research firm) and from
an internal source (through observation of unit sales).
1.1 Literature
In their well-known article, Dorfman and Steiner [9]
examine the static problem of jointly optimizing price
and advertising expenditures, deriving a system of equa-
tions which involve elasticities of demand with respect
to price and with respect to advertising. Nerlove and
Arrow [18] consider a dynamic version of the joint op-
timization problem, using simple dynamics with respect
to the diminishing effect of past advertising and a func-
tional form that allows for an effective separation of the
pricing problem from the system dynamics. Holthausen
and Assmus [12] present a model for the allocation of an
advertising budget to geographic market segments when
the sales response to advertising in each segment is char-
acterized by a probability distribution. It is shown that
allocation decisions that are based on the expected sales
response may be associated with a relatively large de-
gree of risk and, therefore, non-optimal to a risk-averse
manager. Their model produces an “efficient frontier”
in terms of the expected profit and its variance resulting
from alternative budget allocations. The manager then
chooses the optimal allocation based on his/her prefer-
ence function.
In single-person decision problems, information has
a positive benefit at the margin, and more informative
information sources are of (weakly) greater value than
less informative ones [4].1 “Garbling” an information
source, which amounts to adding noise, decreases its
value at least weakly [8]. Naturally, this result persists
in a Bayesian setting [13]: for example, the value of a
Gaussian information source is increasing in its preci-
sion (or “confidence”), defined as the inverse of its vari-
ance. Here we use the Gaussian setting because nor-
mally distributed prior beliefs update to normally dis-
tributed posterior beliefs, by means of observing nor-
mally distributed informative signals [19]. Wald [22] in-
troduces the dynamic information-acquisition problem
∗The author wishes to thank Ksenia Gattiker for valuable research assistance at the outset of this project.
1When multiple decision-makers interact strategically, the marginal value of information may well be negative [10, 11, 23].
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in a very general framework. Based on elements of that
framework, Moscarini and Smith [17] consider infor-
mation acquisition in continuous time so as to inform
a binary decision. A specific binary decision, namely
technology adoption, is considered by McCardle [14]
in discrete time, with information acquisition. This im-
plies an optimal stopping problem and an optimal policy
that depends on belief thresholds. Moore and Whin-
ston [15, 16] also analyze sequential information ac-
quisition, followed by a final action.2 By contrast, we
are concerned here with problems where (nonbinary)
control interventions and information acquisition coex-
ist from period to period, in spirit similar to Weber and
Nguyen [25] who examine a linear-quadratic Gaussian
optimal control problem over an infinite horizon. In our
setting, information acquisition is both internal and ex-
ternal, in the sense that at the beginning of each period
there is an external source of information that can de-
crease the noisiness of the underlying system. Yet, at
the end of each period (only relevant for the first period),
there is an internal information acquisition by observing
a relevant system statistic (in our case, the demand real-
ization) that allows a separate, cost-free Bayesian belief
update.
The main contribution of this paper is to examine
the joint use of advertising and information acquisition
as profitability-enhancing measures the firm can take
and to disentangle their effects, in a simple analytically
tractable setting.
1.2 Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. 2 introduces our model of the firm’s dynamic
price-advertising and information-acquisition decisions.
Sec. 3 provides the quasi-static solution to the firm’s
problem where the firm acquires outside information
and chooses its price and advertising optimally. This
serves as the terminal period for the company’s dynamic
decision problem, which is solved in Sec. 4. Finally,
Sec. 5 concludes the paper. The paper is new in that
it combines the two types of decisions, operational and
informational. In addition, informational actions can be
external as well as internal. Indeed, observing the mar-
ket’s reaction in terms of unit sales (demand) is quasi-
free, as it is directly related to the company’s sales fig-
ures which are readily available in a company’s account-
ing department.
2 Model
Consider a situation where at each time t ∈ {0, 1} the
firm faces a random demand of the form
D˜t(at, pt) = θ˜ + at − pt + ν˜t,
where at is the amount of advertising, pt the firm’s
price, and θ˜ the uncertain market potential whose true
value is persistent between periods, and ν˜t a zero-mean
unsystematic noise term which is independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) between periods. For concrete-
ness, we assume that both random variables are nor-
mally distributed, so that
θ˜ ∼ N (µ, σ2) and ν˜t ∼ N (0, σ2ν),
where µ is the positive expected demand, σ is the pos-
itive standard deviation of the market potential, and σν
is the nonnegative standard deviation of the unsystem-
atic noise. At the beginning of each period, the firm
has the option to acquire an informative signal which—
conditional on the realized market potential θ—is of the
form:
s˜t|θ = θ + ε˜t,
where ε˜t ∼ N (0, 1/κt) is a zero-mean normally dis-
tributed observational noise, with precision κt ≥ 0. If
the signal’s precision vanishes (κt = 0), then the firm
acquires no information at all. The company’s cost real-
ization at time t depends on the demand realization Dt,
its advertising activity at, and the chosen precision κt
of the acquired information:
Ct(at, pt, κt) = cDt + (α/2) a
2
t + βκ
2
t .
The nonnegative marginal production cost c ≥ 0 is con-
stant, the cost of advertising is quadratic (scaled by the
positive constant α), and the cost of information acquisi-
tion is quadratic in the precision (scaled by the nonneg-
ative constant β). To avoid the degenerate outcome that
the firm can increase its demand through advertising at
a marginal cost that is below its marginal benefit, one
needs to assume that marketing expenditures are “sig-
nificant” in the sense that
α > 1/2;
as shown in the next section, this restriction guarantees
that the firm’s absolute spending on advertising stays fi-
nite.
2Some applications in healthcare are of this form; see, e.g., Cipriano and Weber [6] who determine the amount of information to collect
(using public health screening) to inform a planner’s decision to discontinue a public health screening program for hepatitis C.
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Figure 1: Timeline.
Remark 1 (Special Cases). When marginal cost is zero
(c = 0), the firm effectively focuses on revenue maxi-
mization. In practice, this situation may occur for in-
formation products, such as computer software and dig-
ital content (e.g., music or ebooks)—at least approx-
imately.3 The case where advertising becomes pro-
hibitively expensive (α→∞) reduces the firm’s opera-
tional decision variables to price only, which may serve
as an interesting base case. Finally, if the cost of in-
formation acquisition vanishes (β → 0+), then the firm
will simply maximize expected profit (subject to the re-
maining unsystematic risk) and if outside information
becomes prohibitively expensive (β → ∞), then the
firm refrains from acquiring outside market intelligence
and its learning is restricted to what it can gather by ob-
serving demand realizations as a reaction to its opera-
tional price-advertising decisions. As shown in the next
two sections, there exists a positive but finite threshold
for the marginal information-acquisition cost β, above
which the firm will not actively acquire information and
thus is indifferent to any further increase of β.
Let It denote the information available to the firm
at time t. Then the firm’s decision problem consists in
finding a policy pit = pit(It), with pit = (at, pt, κt),
which maximizes its expected discounted profits,
max
(pi0,pi1)
1∑
t=0
E
[
δtΠ˜t(at, pt, κt)
∣∣∣ It] ,
where the firm’s uncertain time-t profit Π˜t(at, pt, κt)
has the realization
Πt(at, pt, κt) = ptDt(at, pt)− Ct(at, pt, κt),
and where δ = 1/(1 + r) ∈ (0, 1] is the firm’s per-
period discount rate based on the per-period interest
rate r ≥ 0.4
The timing and mechanism of the firm’s actions and
Bayesian belief updates are as follows. At the begin-
ning of period t = 0, the firm starts out with a prior
belief about θ˜ which is reflected in the vector of first
and second moments (µ, σ2), which provide a com-
plete description of the underlying normal distribution
N (µ, σ2). Then the firm chooses κ0, effectively de-
ciding about how much external market intelligence to
acquire, which will allow it to observe the signal re-
alization s0, based on which its belief is updated to
(µ0, σ
2
0). The firm then selects its time-0 operational
variables, advertising (a0) and price (p0), and observes
the demand realization d = D0(a0, p0) which allows
for a further Bayesian update of its belief about θ˜, to
(µd, σ
2
d). At the beginning of period t = 1, the firm de-
cides about how much information to acquire in terms
of the signal precision κ1, and then updates its belief
accordingly. Finally, the firm chooses its time-1 opera-
tional variables a1 and p1 so as to maximize this period’s
profits. Fig. 1 summarizes the timing of the information
updates and the firm’s operational decisions.
The dynamic programming principle [2, 3] implies
that a solution to this finite-horizon discrete-time dy-
namic optimization problem can be obtained via back-
ward induction, starting with the second period. Ac-
cordingly we obtain the quasi-static policy as the termi-
nal policy of the two-period problem, which is discussed
next in Sec. 3. The first-period problem is then solved
in Sec. 4.
3Upon closer examination, the provision of most information products does in fact have a positive marginal cost, albeit possibly very small.
4The interest r can be viewed as the firm’s opportunity cost of capital, corresponding to the investors’ next-best investment return at the
same risk. Interestingly, the firm’s risk in this model is endogenously determined by its actions, and consequently the company’s internal
risk-return tradeoff may not be the same as the risk-return tradeoff in the market (as exemplified by the local slope of the efficient frontier in
a CAPM-setting). The latter means that in fact the applicable discount rate may vary (at least in the medium-run) as a function of the firm’s
actions, an interesting second-order effect we are neglecting here.
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3 Quasi-Static Policy
At the end of the last period (t = 1), the firm’s belief
about the market potential θ˜ is given by (µ1, σ21). The
firm now solves a profit-maximization problem with re-
spect to its operational variables,
max
a1,p1
{
(p1 − c)(µ1 + a1 − p1)− (α/2) a21
}
,
which yields the unique solution
a∗1 = αˆ (µ1 − c),
p∗1 = (1 + αˆ)
µ1 + c
2
,
where we denote by
αˆ , 1
2α− 1 ∈ [0,∞)
the advertising effectiveness which is decreasing in α >
1/2 and tends to zero as α goes to infinity (i.e., when ad-
vertising becomes prohibitively expensive). The firm’s
maximized terminal expected profit is obtained by sub-
stituting (a∗1, p
∗
1) into the preceding objective function:
Π∗1 = (1 + αˆ)
(µ1 − c)2
4
.
Given the firm’s belief (µd, σ2d), information acquisition
(via κ1) therefore results in expected profits of
Πˆ1(κ1) ,
(
1 + αˆ
4
)
E
[
(µ1(s˜1)− c)2
]
− βκ21.
The value for the firm derives from the fact that its ter-
minal operational decisions can be adjusted. Indeed, af-
ter having observed the informative signal realization s1
the firm can update its market-potential estimator from
µd to the weighted average
µ1(s1) = λ1s1 + (1− λ1)µd,
where λ1 , κ1σ2d/(1 + κ1σ2d) ∈ [0, 1] is increasing in
κ1.5 As a result, the terminal profit (prior to information
acquisition) becomes
Πˆ1(κ1) =
1 + αˆ
4
[
(µd − c)2 + λ21σ2d
]− βκ21
=
1 + αˆ
4
[
(µd − c)2 + κ
2
1σ
6
d
(1 + κ1σ2d)
2
]
− βκ21.
The first term of the firm’s payoff is independent of the
informational precision and corresponds to the firm’s
profit without information acquisition. The sum of the
following two terms is concave in κ1 and maximization
yields the firm’s optimal terminal information acquisi-
tion,6
κ∗1 =
[(
1 + αˆ
4β
)1/3
− 1
σ2d
]
+
=
[
1
σ
¯
2
d
− 1
σ2d
]
+
,
where σ
¯
2
d , (4β/(1 + αˆ))
1/3 denotes the variance
threshold. For belief variances σ2d below the threshold
σ
¯
2
d at the beginning of the second period it is in the firm’s
best interest not to acquire any information prior to tak-
ing its terminal operational decisions; see Fig. 2.
Figure 2: Optimal information acquisition at time t = 1.
Remark 2 (Information-Cost Threshold). The ex-
pression for κ∗1 implies the cost threshold β¯d , (1 +
αˆ)σ6d/4, so that nontrivial market intelligence is eco-
nomical if and only if the firm’s information-acquisition
cost is such that β ∈ (0, β¯d).
Substituting the firm’s terminal information-
acquisition policy into its expected payoffs yields
Πˆ1(κ
∗
1) = (1 + αˆ)
(
(µd − c)2
4
+
σ2d
4
[
1− σ¯
2
d
σ2d
]3
+
)
.
The last expression neatly illustrates the separate effects
of information acquisition and of advertising in the com-
pany’s quasi-static decision problem that it faces in the
last period. Information acquisition improves the effec-
tiveness of both pricing and advertising, resulting in an
additive improvement ∆1 ≥ 0 of the no-advertising-no-
information profit (µd − c)2/4. This augmented profit
is scaled by the factor (1 + αˆ) which contains the adver-
tising effectiveness αˆ ≥ 0. In other words,
Πˆ∗1 , Πˆ1(κ∗1) = (1 + αˆ) (Π1(0, pm1 , 0) + ∆1) ,
5The firm also updates the variance of its belief, from σ2d to σ
2
d/(1 + κ1σ
2
d), independent of s1.
6Here and in what follows we use the abbreviation [x]+ , max{0, x} for all x ∈ R.
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where pm1 , (µd + c)/2 is the standard solution of
the monopoly pricing problem [21] with linear demand
curve without advertising and without information ac-
quisition, while
∆1 ,
σ2d
4
[
1− σ¯
2
d
σ2d
]3
+
is the information-related (pre-advertising) profit incre-
ment. The firm’s expected monopoly profit without ad-
vertising and information acquisition is
Π1(0, p
m
1 , 0) =
(µd − c)2
4
.
The expected value of sample information (EVSI) about
the demand at time t = 1 is the difference between the
firm’s optimal time-1 profit and its profit without infor-
mation acquisition:
EVSI1 = Πˆ∗1 − Πˆ1(0) = (1 + αˆ)∆1.
This expression implies a complementarity between ad-
vertising and information acquisition, in the sense that a
better advertising effectiveness also increases the value
of information, as noted in the following remark.
Remark 3 (Parameter Sensitivity). The firm’s opti-
mal time-1 profit Πˆ∗1 is increasing in the advertising ef-
fectiveness αˆ and (weakly) decreasing in the marginal
information-acquisition cost β, with corresponding sen-
sitivities
∂Πˆ∗1
∂αˆ
= Π1(0, p
m
1 , 0) +
σ2d
4
[
1− σ¯
2
d
σ2d
]2
+
> 0,
and
∂Πˆ∗1
∂β
=
∂(EVSI1)
∂β
= −
[
1
σ
¯
2
d
− 1
σ2d
]2
+
≤ 0,
respectively.7
Remark 4 (Perfect Information). In the fortunate case
where β → 0+, information-acquisition costs vanish
and the firm can obtain perfect demand information at
no cost. This implies an expected value of perfect infor-
mation (EVPI),
EVPI1 =
(1 + αˆ)σ2d
4
.
The latter is an upper bound for the expected value of
sample information, EVSI1, determined earlier.
4 Dynamic Policy
We are now ready to consider the firm’s dynamic two-
period decision problem, as formulated in Sec. 2. The
firm’s second-period problem amounts to the quasi-
static profit-maximization problem discussed in the last
section. Pursuing the dynamic-programming strategy of
backward induction, in what follows we first look at the
firm’s belief update from the observed demand realiza-
tion. The latter allows learning even if no information
is acquired from the outside. We then turn our attention
to the operational decisions, before we solve the initial
information-acquisition problem.
4.1 Learning from Demand Observation
In addition to externally furnished costly market intelli-
gence, the firm usually has access to the information re-
vealed by the market’s response to its product offering,
which in our case is modulated by the product price p0
and the company’s advertising activity a0. Indeed, the
firm’s realized demand at the end of the first period is
D0 = θ + a0 − p0 + ν0,
where θ and ν0 are the realizations of the unknown (and
therefore random) market potential θ˜ and the unsystem-
atic noise ν˜0, respectively. Similar to the belief update
in the terminal period, the belief update about θ˜ is in-
formed by the realization
sd = D0 − (a0 − p0)
of an informative signal, with conditional distribution
s˜d|θ ∼ N (θ, σ2ν).
That is, the confidence related to the firm’s demand ob-
servation is given by
κν , 1/σ2ν .
As before, we obtain the firm’s updated estimate for the
market potential as weighted average,
µd(sd) = λdsd + (1− λd)µ0,
where λd , κνσ20/(1+κνσ20). Meanwhile, the updated
variance is given by (see footnote 5)
σ2d =
σ20
1 + κνσ20
=
σ20σ
2
ν
σ20 + σ
2
ν
.
7Moreover, the firm’s optimal time-1 profit is (weakly) convex in αˆ and β, respectively. However, the cross-effect of the two parameters is
(weakly) negative, ∂2Πˆ∗1/(∂αˆ∂β) ≤ 0, so an increase in the advertising effectiveness increases the firm’s sensitivity with respect to decreases
in the marginal information-acquisition cost.
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The expressions for the demand-induced updated be-
lief (µd, σ2d) can now be substituted into the terminal
profit Πˆ∗1 obtained in the preceding section:
Π¯∗1 = (1 + αˆ)
[
(µ0 − c)2
4
+ ∆0
]
,
where
∆0 ,
σ60/4
(σ20 + σ
2
ν)
2
+
σ20σ
2
ν/4
σ20 + σ
2
ν
[
1− σ
2
0 + σ
2
ν
σ20
σ
¯
2
d
σ2ν
]3
+
.
The first term on the right-hand side represents the firm’s
EVSI for the demand observation, which is increasing
in its belief uncertainty σ20 . Viewed from the end of the
first period, the second term on the right-hand side cap-
tures the fact that information is anticipated to be ac-
quired in the following terminal period if and only if
1
σ20
+
1
σ2ν
<
1
σ
¯
2
d
.
In particular, the “target variance” σ
¯
2
d needs to be strictly
smaller than min{σ20 , σ2ν}, that is, smaller than the vari-
ance of the unsystematic noise and smaller than the
residual variance after external information acquisition
at the beginning of the first period.
Remark 5 (Information-Value Consistency). To ex-
amine the consistency of the expected information val-
ues ∆0 and ∆1 before and immediately after the firm’s
observing demand, consider the extreme cases of perfect
inference (where σν → 0+) and uninformative infer-
ence (where σν → ∞), respectively. (i) With noiseless
demand information one obtains limσν→0+ ∆0 = σ
2
0/4
and ∆1 = 0. Moreover, the expected value of per-
fect information after the demand update vanishes (i.e.,
EVPI1 = 0); earlier, the expected value of perfect de-
mand information is EVPI0 = (1 + αˆ)σ20/4, analogous
to the earlier expression for EVPI1 with acquisition of
perfect information (for κ1 → ∞) in period 1 (with σ2d
replaced by σ20). (ii) With uninformative demand in-
formation it is limσν→∞∆0 = ∆1|σd=σ0 : the firm’s
beliefs are transmitted “unfiltered” from period 0 to pe-
riod 1, in the sense that (µd, σ2d) = (µ0, σ
2
0).
The expected time-0 value of future information ac-
quisition ∆0 is increasing in the firm’s belief uncer-
tainty σ20 ∈ [0,∞), and
∆1|σd=σ0 =
σ20
4
[
1− σ¯
2
d
σ20
]3
+
≤ ∆0 ≤ σ
2
0
4
,
with the bounds obtained in Remark 5.
4.2 Operational Decisions
Based on the firm’s “free” belief update, by actively
using its own internal market intelligence 8 the firm’s
profit-maximization problem, after initial information
acquisition (κ0), is similar to the problem in the terminal
period (our “quasi-static setting” in Sec. 3):
max
a0,p0
{
(p0 − c)(µ0 + a0 − p0)− (α/2) a20
}
,
with the unique solution
a∗0 = αˆ (µ0 − c),
p∗0 = (1 + αˆ)
µ0 + c
2
,
as before. As a result, the optimal expected discounted
profit (after initial information acquisition) becomes
Πˆ0(κ0) = Eµ0
[
(1 + αˆ)(µ0 − c)2
4
+ δΠ¯∗1
]
− βκ20,
given the firm’s initial belief (µ, σ2).
4.3 Information-Acquisition Decisions
Consider now the problem of external information ac-
quisition at the outset. As before, Bayesian updating
of the firm’s initial belief (µ, σ2) using the informative
external signal realization s0 at the chosen confidence
level κ0 yields
µ0(s0) = λ0s0 + (1− λ0)µ,
where λ0 = κ0σ2/(1 + κ0σ2), and
σ20 =
σ2
1 + κ0σ2
.
Substituting this into the last formula of the previous
subsection leads to an expected discounted profit,
Πˆ0(κ0) =
(1 + αˆ)(1 + δ)
4
[
(µ− c)2 + κ
2
0σ
6
(1 + κ0σ2)2
]
+ (1 + αˆ) δ∆ˆ0(κ0)− βκ20,
where the expected future informational gain,
∆ˆ0(κ0) , ∆0|σ0=σ2/(1+κ0σ2) ,
is now evaluated with respect to the firm’s initial be-
lief (µ, σ2). As discussed earlier, the latter is tightly
bounded:
∆ˆ0,min ≤ ∆ˆ0 ≤ ∆ˆ0,max,
where ∆ˆ0,max , σ2/(4(1 + κ0σ2)) and
∆ˆ0,min ,
σ2/4
1 + κ0σ2
[
1− (1 + κ0σ2)σ¯
2
d
σ2
]3
+
.
8The internal information may be provided by the accounting department or a market-intelligence group tasked with evaluating demand.
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While the time-0 information-acquisition problem does
not have an explicit solution, closed-form expressions
for “boundary solutions” are available when ∆ˆ0 is re-
placed by one of its bounds.9 The optimal time-0 infor-
mation acquisition κ∗0 satisfies
κ∗0 ∈ arg max
κ0≥0
{
(1 + δ)κ20σ
6
4(1 + κ0σ2)2
+ δ∆ˆ0(κ0)− βκ
2
0
1 + αˆ
}
,
and can be determined numerically using standard
methods.10
The belief update in the future depends on the firm’s
choice of κ0. Indeed, the variance after the demand ob-
servation is
σ2d =
σ20
1 + κνσ20
∣∣∣∣
σ20=
σ2
1+κ0σ
2
=
σ2
1 + (κ0 + κν)σ2
,
which illustrates the fact that the confidence levels of
subsequent belief updates are additive.11 In this manner,
the firm’s optimal time-1 information-acquisition deci-
sion can be written as a function of its time-0 informa-
tion acquisition:
κ∗1(κ0) =
[
1
σ
¯
2
d
− 1
σ2
− (κ0 + κν)
]
+
.
This means that the firm acquires information in the sec-
ond period if and only if its accumulated confidence
does not exceed the target confidence level κ
¯d
, 1/σ
¯
2
d:
κ∗1(κ0) > 0 ⇔ κ0 + κν +
1
σ2
> κ
¯d
.
More specifically, the firm’s confidence at the end of
the horizon (see footnote 11), after having observed all
available information, will be equal to
1
σ21
= max
{
κ
¯d
, κ0 + κν +
1
σ2
}
,
where κ
¯d
= ((1 + αˆ)/(4β))1/3. In the second pe-
riod, provided there is an incentive to acquire a positive
amount of information (so κ∗1(κ0) > 0), the firm con-
siders κ1 and κ0 to be perfect substitutes:
dκ∗1(κ0)
dκ0
= −1{κ0<κ¯ d−κν−(1/σ2)}.
In case the firm does not want to acquire any informa-
tion in the second period, so κ∗1(κ0) = 0, the expected
future informational gain,
∆ˆ0(κ0|κ∗1 = 0) =
1
4
(
κνσ
2
1 + (κ0 + κν)σ2
)2
σ2
1 + κ0σ2
,
stems only from the upcoming costless observation of
demand. As κν increases, the firm’s incentive to acquire
information in the first period decreases. Indeed, since
∆ˆ0(κ0|κ∗1 = 0) is submodular in (κ0, κν),12 κ∗0 is de-
creasing in the confidence κν with respect to demand
observations, provided that κ∗1 = 0. On the other hand,
if κν becomes sufficiently large, it will be best for the
firm to stop acquiring information in the second period:
there is a threshold confidence level κ
¯ ν
, so that 13
κν ≥ κ¯ ν ⇒ κ
∗
1 = 0.
On the other hand, if the demand observation is uninfor-
mative (i.e., if κν = 0), then
∆ˆ0(κ0) =
σ2/4
1 + κ0σ2
,
which leads to an optimal time-0 confidence level
κ∗0 that is less than the solution one would ob-
tain conditional on κ∗1 = 0 when the firm’s
information-acquisition problem would be isomorphic
to its information-acquisition problem at time 1, up to
the factor (1 + δ).14 The following main result largely
summarizes the preceding discussions.
Theorem (Optimal Information Acquisition). Con-
sider variations of the firm’s (nonnegative) confi-
dence κν in demand observations.
(i) If the precision κ0 of the information collected
in the first period (weakly) exceeds the optimal
amount κ∗0, then information acquisition in the
second period is never optimal (i.e., κ∗1(κ0) = 0);
in particular: κ∗1(κ
∗
0) = 0.
(ii) If, for some suboptimal κ0 implemented in the
first period, information collection is optimal in
the second period (i.e., κ∗1(κ0) > 0), then κν
is a direct substitute for κ∗1 (in the sense that
∂κ∗1/∂κν = −1), as long as κν stays below the
threshold κ
¯ ν
(κ0) , κ¯ d−κ0 beyond which κ
∗
1(κ0)
vanishes;
9As roots of fourth-degree polynomials these expressions are, however, not particularly informative, and have therefore been omitted.
10Here we use the fact that the solution to a maximization problem is homogeneous of degree zero. A solution to this nonconvex problem
exists by the Weierstrass theorem ([3], p. 540); in this context, one can restrict attention to a compact interval (i.e., to κ0 ∈ [0, κ¯0] for some
κ¯0 ∈ (0,∞)) because the objective function is coercive for large values of κ0 ([3], p. 539). For global optimality conditions, see [24].
11The firm’s belief variance, after having observed the signal s˜1 with confidence κ1, is σ21 = σ
2/(1 + (κ0 + κ1 + κν)σ2).
12A sufficient condition for submodularity is that ∂2∆ˆ0(κ0|κ∗1 = 0)/(∂κ0∂κν) = −(3/2)κνσ8/(1 + (κ0 + κν)σ2)4 < 0.
13One possible threshold is κ
¯ν
, max{0, κ
¯d
− (1/σ2) − κ
¯
∗
0}, where κ¯
∗
0 , limκν→∞ κ∗0 is the asymptotic confidence of time-0 infor-
mation collection as κν → ∞. Note that even for κν → ∞, information acquisition in the first period may be optimal (κ∗0 > 0) because it
carries an immediate benefit for the firm’s operational decisions before demand is observed.
14In that case, one would obtain κ∗0 =
[
1+δ
σ
¯
2
d
− 1
σ2
]
+
which would imply that κ∗1(κ
∗
0) = 0 because
1
σ2
d
= max
{
1
σ2
, 1+δσ
¯
2
d
}
≥ 1σ
¯
2
d
.
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(iii) For κν ≥ κ¯ ν , the optimal first-period confidence
κ∗0 decreases, and as in part (i): κ
∗
1 = 0.
Part (i) of the theorem states that with optimal in-
formation collection in the first period it is never opti-
mal to collect information in the second period. Due
to space constraints our proof for this statement will
be somewhat informal via three observations, leaving
some of the analytical details as exercise to the reader.
The first observation is that in order to encourage in-
formation collection in the second period it is best to
set κν = 0. This is in view of part (ii) of the theo-
rem which is a direct result from the explicit expression
for κ∗1(κ0) given earlier. In other words, if κ
∗
1 > 0 is
optimal for some κν > 0, then κ∗0 > 0 is a forteriori
also optimal for κν = 0. Our second observation is
that for δ = 0, the firm does not care about the future,
and the first-period problem is equivalent to the quasi-
static problem discussed in Sec. 3. In that case, the
firm’s optimal first-period information acquisition will
be κ∗0 =
[
κ
¯d
− (1/σ2)]
+
, so that the confidence at the
beginning of the second period is κd = κ¯d
. But this im-
mediately implies that κ∗1 = 0. The third observation is
that κ∗0 is nondecreasing in the discount factor δ given
that κ∗1 = 0 (and κν = 0). This holds because in that
case the first-period objective function Πˆ0 is supermod-
ular in (κ0, δ).15 This concludes our informal proof.
Intuitively, information collected in the first period
remains useful in the second period, so that the firm
can “double-dip” (improving two sets of operational de-
cisions in different periods) by acquiring information
early. However, while this intuition is appealing, the re-
sult does come with a certain surprise because the infor-
mation acquisition cost is after all convex in the signal
precision, which a priori would suggest some consump-
tion smoothing across periods with respect to informa-
tion acquisition.
4.4 Extension: Info-Budget Constraint
While our main result indicates that costly information
should be acquired early if its use value carries across
periods, this may not be possible in practice because of
the budgetary realities that firms face. Periodic plan-
ning that is tied to accounting cycles usually implies
budgets for various actions, especially when it comes
to the solicitation of outside information-collection ser-
vices. Given a positive per-period “info-budget” of B
for information collection, this implies a maximum per-
period information acquisition of
κ¯B =
√
B/c.
Hence, from the theorem established in Sec. 4.3
one obtains immediately that the optimal information-
collection policy (κˆ∗0, κ
∗
1) is such that
κˆ∗0 = min{κ∗0, κ¯B} and κˆ∗1 = min{κ∗1(κˆ∗0), κ¯B};
that is, the per-period budget constraint simply caps
the unconstrained first-period information acquisition
and then the firm’s conditionally optimal second-period
choice. In particular, the budget constraint–when
binding–induces a smoothing of the firm’s external in-
formation acquisition across periods; see Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Cumulative confidence with budget-
constrained information acquisition, as a function of the
precision of the firm’s demand observation.
4.5 Numerical Example
Unconstrained Information Acquisition. Consider a
firm with operational costs (α, β) = (1, 0.1) and dis-
count factor δ = 0.8; this implies an advertising effec-
tiveness of αˆ = 1/(2·1−1) = 1. The time-1 confidence
target is given by
κ
¯d
=
1
σ
¯
2
d
=
(
1 + αˆ
4β
)1/3
≈ 1.71.
15Up to a multiplicative constant, the cross-partial of the objective function, ∂
2Π0
∂κ0∂δ
∼ ∂
∂κ0
(
κ20σ
6/(4(1 + κ0σ2)2) + ∆ˆ0(κ0)
)
, is non-
negative given that ∆ˆ0(κ0) = 0 in the case where κν = κ∗1(κ0) = 0. Thus, one obtains the supermodularity of Πˆ0 in (κ0, δ). Finally, note
that ∆ˆ0 vanishes for κ∗0 for δ = 0, and it also vanishes when it is even larger (confirmed by the supermodularity) for δ > 0.
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Figure 4: Unconstrained first-period information acqui-
sition κ∗0 as a function of κν in the numerical example.
Assuming that the firm’s initial belief about demand
is given by (µ, σ2) with expectation µ = 100 and stan-
dard deviation σ = 30 (so the coefficient of variation
is 30%), the initial confidence level is 1/σ2 ≈ 0.0011.
This is three orders of magnitude below the target con-
fidence κ
¯d
, which suggests that active information ac-
quisition may be desirable—even if it is costly. Fig. 4
shows the optimal first-period information acquisition
policy as a function of κν in the absence of any info-
budget constraint. As shown earlier, the second-period
information acquisition vanishes in that case, so κ∗1 = 0
for all κν ≥ 0.
Budget-Constrained Information Acquisition. Suppose
now that the firm has a positive info-budget B so that
κ¯B < κ
∗
0 at least for small values of κν . Then qualita-
tively the optimal-information acquisition policy is as in
Fig. 3. Specifically, for our numerical values we obtain
a second-period information acquisition of the form
κ∗1(κˆ
∗
1) ≈ min
{
[1.7089− κˆ∗1 − κν ]+ ,
√
10B
}
,
for all κν ≥ 0, where κˆ∗0 is the truncated unconstrained
first-period information acquisition, as noted in Sec. 4.4.
5 Conclusion
The ability to advertise allows the firm to scale up its
profitability. It also increases the returns on additional
information about its uncertain demand. In the absence
of spending constraints and given a stationary random
demand, we obtain that information should be acquired
upfront so as to be used multiple times. In that sense, in-
formation can behave like an investment good that pays
a periodic rent through the operational improvements it
enables.
The firm’s short-term interest in information ex-
hibits a threshold; its goal in the quasi-static setting (at
the end of the finite time horizon) is to achieve a tar-
get confidence level, as if it was following an (s, S)-
inventory policy [1, 20]. When actively considering
the future, such as at the initial time (t = 0), the firm
rationally anticipates future benefits of acquired infor-
mation in addition to the expected effects of any cost-
less complementary signals observed later, for exam-
ple, as a result of intermittent demand observations via
the data stream from its accounting department. It is
interesting that threshold effects arise despite the fact
that information-acquisition cost is quadratic in the sig-
nal precision.16 To achieve a very high precision the
firm can expect a substantial information-acquisition
expense which may well violate internal budget con-
straints.17 The latter may lead to the (constrained)
smoothing of information consumption over time in-
stead of full upfront information collection in the un-
constrained case.
Our work fits in with an increasing interest in the
interaction of costly information and operational deci-
sions, for example in inventory control problems [7]
or in pricing problems [5]. The fundamental differ-
ence between advertising and information as drivers of
profitability is that advertising tends to enlarge the pie,
whereas information renders the size of the pie and the
effect of the operational decisions less uncertain. Infor-
mation is therefore not an end in itself,18 but rather a
complement to managerial actions.
An interesting direction for future research may be
an extension of this framework to situations where the
quality of the costly information depends on the oper-
ational actions (e.g., the demand information gathered
from an advertising campaign or by means of a price
discount), giving rise to “monopoly experimentation.”
Then the firm would need to trade off the possible lack
in optimality of its operational experiments in the short-
run against the increased confidence in its demand infor-
mation in the medium-run together with the improved
operational decisions the firm will be able to take.
16The cost of external information is naturally convex because it becomes more and more difficult to increase the confidence in demand
information, e.g., by enlarging the sample further, beyond an established panel. The threshold nature of information acquisition also obtains in
a linear-quadratic infinite-horizon setting with Gaussian noise and linear cost of information acquisition [25].
17Even if the external market intelligence provides a noise-free signal (of infinite confidence), the firm continues to experience uncertainty
from period to period because of the persistent unsystematic noise in the system. In particular, the perfect adaptation of price and advertising
to actually realized demand conditions in any given period remains a zero-probability event.
18This is notwithstanding investors’ having a vested interest to reduce profit uncertainty, all else equal; see also footnote 4.
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